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Policymakers across the developing world are facing the need to make rapid decisions on their COVID-19 
response with little available data or guidance. IGC is working to support these decision-making 
processes by increasing the supply of data and distilling relevant policy guidance. We are launching a large 
collaborative data collection effort to provide policymakers with access to the best available data on the 
spread of the virus and its evolving economic impact so that the policy responses can be tailored to the 
local context and capacity and adjusted in real time. We are also drawing on the expertise of researchers in 
economics, development and health to set out provisional guidance based on the limited evidence available 
so far. This policy guidance reflects our current thinking. It is a living document that will be updated as new 
evidence becomes available.
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Overview
1. The COVID-19 health crisis is an economic crisis: Limiting social interactions to slow the 
spread of the virus has also limited economic interactions essential to employment and trade, 
leading to a collapse in economic activity in developing countries, undermining livelihoods and 
increasing extreme poverty and hunger. Policies that help deal with the economic crisis are an 
essential part of the set of policies needed to deal with the health crisis. A functioning economy is 
crucial to population health, especially in high poverty communities.
2. The policy responses in developed countries to the COVID-19 crisis do not provide a good 
model for developing countries: The imposition of extended blanket lockdowns risks causing 
widespread deprivation and unintended health consequences in developing countries, which are 
also experiencing sharp drops in commodity prices, remittances, tourism and trade and have 
limited fiscal and institutional capacity to support vulnerable households. The COVID-19 policy 
response in developing countries must take into account these factors and be tailored to the local 
context in each country.
3. Containment strategies must weigh COVID-19 health risks against deprivation and long-
term economic damage: In poorer countries, lockdowns are already having devastating 
effects on incomes and consumption, driving significant numbers of households into extreme 
poverty and severe deprivation. The COVID-19 response also has other health implications, as 
immunisations are not being undertaken, mothers are not going to hospital to deliver and other 
conditions are going untreated. In the longer term, mass unemployment, in the formal and informal 
sectors, and measures such as school closures risk scarring a generation. Governments must 
design containment strategies that reduce contagion while limiting the economic, health and 
social damage.
4. Supporting livelihoods is crucial: Direct support to individuals, where feasible, is a crucial 
element of the policy response. The crisis has already led to a dramatic expansion of social 
protection in middle income countries. In these countries, expanding coverage should be the 
priority, as discussed below. In low income countries, however, social protection for the poorest 
is minimal. Support from the international community is essential. But it is only a partial solution, 
not least as poor countries have limited capacity to deliver support directly to those worst off, 
especially where the newly vulnerable are different from traditional beneficiaries. Policies aimed at 
enabling individuals to continue to be active economically, in the formal and informal sectors, are 
likely to be the only way to sustain livelihoods in these contexts.
5. Containment should stop the interactions that create the most contagion risk and allow the 
interactions that do most to reduce deprivation: In countries where populations are extremely 
vulnerable to the economic dislocation created by lockdowns, and where the public sector has 
limited capacity to provide social assistance, some interactions can be safely banned whereas 
others must continue. Local knowledge should be used to evaluate the need for an initial short 
period of lockdown and the role for a wide range of intermediate policies towards interactions. 
This can enable a smart approach to containment that: 
  Ensures continued access to food, critical health care and other essential items.
  Limits broad lockdowns, where deemed essential, to short periods of time to reduce the 
impact on livelihoods.
  Imposes (and lifts) restrictions locally, taking into account regional and local prevalence 
and trends in infection rates as well as the economic impact, rather than imposing a uniform 
national policy. 
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  Promotes physical distancing wherever feasible, and encourages learning by local 
governments and communities on how best to achieve this.
  Bans large-scale gatherings that provide little economic (or health) benefit. 
  Allows economic activities to continue while encouraging appropriate distancing and 
hygiene protocols. 
  Develops tools that will make it safer to end containment policies, such as distribution 
networks for face masks and PPE, sentinel surveillance and possibly individual testing.
6. Effective messaging is essential to secure community support: Governments must signal 
the enormity of the challenge as the first step in securing the required change in behaviour 
and support for public action. Local conditions may suggest that an initial period of broad 
lockdown is necessary ‘shock therapy’ for this purpose, but there may also be other ways of 
impressing the seriousness of the challenge. More generally, clear, consistent, and effective 
messaging – backed by data as it becomes available – across communities and all parts and 
levels of government will be necessary to secure popular support for containment measures. 
Achieving high rates of individual compliance with hygiene, distancing and mobility regulations 
will require effective messaging informed by behavioural science, and working with local leaders 
to ensure effective dissemination of messaging through communities. Without buy-in from local 
communities, containment strategies are unlikely to succeed. The messaging should also focus 
on de-stigmatisation of individuals, so that those who are potentially infected feel comfortable 
taking proactive measures like self-isolating and seeking medical care, and of specific 
communities, usually minorities, so they are not targeted as disease vectors.
 
Policy response: Smart containment strategies
Containment strategy primarily concerns restrictions on human interactions; these 
restrictions must weigh contagion risks against the benefits of interaction. In this section, 
we categorise interactions to ban and interactions to permit, and discuss the many interactions 
where appropriate action depends on local conditions. We also discuss policies that can make 
interactions less dangerous, like public hygiene and policies that can enable better decision-making 
about imposing and lifting restrictions on interaction.
1. COVID-19 cannot be fought without data: Policy decisions regarding when, where and how 
to impose and lift restrictions require data on prevalence, trends and transmission. Data is 
also necessary to assess growing risks of deprivation or even hunger. Large-scale individual 
COVID-19 testing may not be feasible in most low-income countries, and so governments 
must leverage on approaches that provide the most information with limited testing facilities, 
e.g. pooled testing and measures of hospital utilisation, while urgently investing in other data 
sources. In addition, data is needed on food prices in local areas to identify shortages and feed 
into policy responses. These issues are discussed in the ‘data priorities’ section below.
2. Hygiene measures can help reduce the risks from interaction: While physical distancing is 
the most effective measure for reducing transmission, hygiene measures can help reduce the 
risks from interactions (while also reducing the risks from other contagious diseases). Priority 
should be given to hygiene measures that are effective in the local context, backed by effective 
public messaging to increase social pressure and government and NGO resources to increase 
access to clean water:
  Handwashing and hand sanitising, possibly supported by free distribution of water and 
soap.
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  Coughing and sneezing into the elbow.
  Disinfecting public places and public transport.
3. Preventing harmful interactions:
  Physical distancing, isolation, and shielding: High priority should also be given to 
physical distancing, particularly in public places, and especially to isolation of infected 
people and shielding of the vulnerable. Policies must recognise the challenges posed 
by high density informal settlements, where, for example, isolation may require use of 
other physical barriers, including face masks, and hygiene measures (especially where no 
physical barriers are possible). Priority should be given to measures to promote:
  Physical distancing in public places, as the highest priority measure.
  Use of face masks, or other facial coverings, where feasible, especially for the infected.
  Self or family quarantine to isolate the infected or the exposed, where feasible.
  Shielding of the most vulnerable, through isolation or alternative measures.
  Special measures in high density settings such as informal settlements where isolation 
and shielding are most challenging – such as ensuring sufficient water supply without 
requiring residents to wait in long lines and publicly provided handwashing stations and 
quarantine spaces, where feasible.
  Restrictions on public gatherings and higher density interactions: Restrictions are also 
needed on events and settings that make physical distancing difficult or impossible, such 
as large sports or religious events. Caution is needed, however, in applying restrictions 
to large public markets where these are a vital part of commerce and food supply. Policy 
priorities are:
  Imposing a ban on large public gatherings.
  Ensuring that policy responses to the crisis do not create new public gatherings, by 
distributing food or cash assistance from central locations, for example. 
  Regulating, not banning, high density markets that are a vital part of the food chain, 
including spacing out markets where feasible to support physical distancing. 
  Using public hygiene tools, such as handwashing stations, hand sanitiser, free 
face masks, and disposable gloves to limit contagion risk and supplement physical 
distancing, which may be difficult to maintain in some markets.
  Restrictions on large scale migration: Mass migration can spread the disease to new 
regions and involve high levels of contact between the travellers. Migration may be 
particularly risky when it is from a high prevalence region to a low prevalence region, and 
from low transmission (R0<1) to high transmission areas. Policy should aim to:
  Limit large scale migration events, such as religious holidays, wherever possible.
  Consider the appropriate local approach to urban-rural migration taking into account 
support for livelihoods, food supplies, prevalence rates and transmission rates in cities 
versus relevant rural areas, as well as whether agricultural labour is needed for harvests.
  Impose quarantine requirements to limit the risk that migrants bring disease into low 
prevalence communities. 
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4. Enabling necessary interactions:
  Maintaining supply chains, especially for food, healthcare and other essentials: 
Where governments lack the fiscal and institutional capacity to support livelihoods directly, 
measures to maintain supply chains, employment and trade are critical for avoiding mass 
deprivation. The highest priority should be given to maintaining supply chains in food, 
health care and other essentials.
  Containment measures should be designed to minimise disruptions to key supply 
chains, especially those for food, health care and other essential goods, as the burden 
for supplying these goods will otherwise fall to the public sector which lacks the 
capacity to do so at the scale needed.
  Transmission risk along vulnerable nodes of the food supply chain, such as large 
markets and transport links, should be reduced through physical distancing, hygiene 
measures and mask wearing, reinforced by public messaging. 
  Data on food prices in local areas should be monitored to identify shortages and feed 
into policy responses.
  Governments should explore co-ordinating their procurement of essential supplies – 
such as masks, personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies – with other 
countries to improve supplies and quality during this period when markets are not 
working efficiently. 
  Border controls should be monitored to avoid unnecessary disruption to international 
trade and supply chains. 
  Containment measures should minimise disruption to other markets, supply chains, and 
transport links, with the aim of maintaining internal trade and economic activity where 
physical distancing and/or hygiene measures can keep the risk of transmission low.
  Supporting rural areas: Most poor people live in rural areas, which is also where most 
food is produced. In some countries, agricultural exports are a key source of foreign 
exchange, especially now with the collapse of natural resource prices. Agricultural 
productivity involves collaboration with other farmers and with transport services. 
Consequently, many rural interactions must continue.
  Physical distancing must not interfere with planting and harvesting, which determine 
yearly incomes for farming households, and provides the food supply to keep prices 
affordable elsewhere. 
  Food distribution must continue to connect rural areas with urban customers. Public 
hygiene steps, such as face masks and disposable gloves, should be used to limit the 
spread of contagion along the food supply chain. 
  Rural areas often have the information that they need to set their own containment 
policies. Whenever possible, rules should be set at the lowest possible level.
  Maintaining critical public services: Governments must identify which public services 
should be prioritised and should ensure the supply of people and goods to provide those 
services remains robust.
  The health sector is particularly critical, but also particularly vulnerable. The 
development of context appropriate practices to reduce risks and the supply of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) is vital for health workers that interact with 
COVID-19 patients. 
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  Public safety is at risk during any crisis, especially since the health of police personnel is 
also at risk. Public sector workers who are needed to maintain public safety should also 
be prioritised for PPE and hygiene measures, as should vital transport workers. 
  Data collection and analysis is essential to guide the policy response and target scarce 
public resources. 
  Governments must identify which public services to prioritise and the financial and non-
financial challenges of maintaining their effectiveness.
5. Complementary policies:
  Mobility restrictions: Governments should adopt a local approach to containment, 
prioritise mobility restrictions on people, and seek to minimise restrictions on the 
movements of critical goods and services, and on goods more generally.
  Adopt a local approach to containment, taking local prevalence and trends in infection 
rates into account when imposing and lifting restrictions.
  Allow movement to enable economic activities where physical distancing, mask wearing 
and other measures can be used to manage the risk of contagion.
  Adopt a cautious approach to imposing restrictions where the risk of long-term harm is 
greatest (e.g., school closures).
  Require face masks while travelling, where feasible.
  Protect movement in the supply chains for food, health care (including health care 
providers) and other essential services.
  Protect movement for public safety and other critical public services.
  Limit large scale movement where not essential.
  Restrictions on dense but economically important settings such as markets and 
factories. Any setting where many people interact creates risk of contagion, but these 
settings may also be important to economic productivity and supply chains. Priorities 
vary by sector. Manufacturing demand has collapsed and may not return to same level, so 
restructuring may be necessary. Demand for urban services remains, as does agriculture 
demand, so the challenge is to keep supply chains open.
  Dense settings that are vital part of food supply chains, such as markets, must remain 
open with the strongest feasible physical distancing measures. 
  Opening low-density capital-intensive factories may be feasible, but opening high-
density labour-intensive factories is challenging, even though the impact of closures 
on livelihoods is greater. Work is needed on whether assistance might be provided 
leveraging the payroll of these large firms. 
  Allow movement to enable economic activities where physical distancing, mask wearing 
and other measures can be used to manage the risk of transmission.
  Monitor changes in global value chains and manage their impact, where feasible.
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Policy response: Supporting vulnerable households
Lockdowns are already having devastating effects on incomes and consumption, driving 
significant numbers of households into extreme poverty and severe deprivation. Therefore, 
support to vulnerable households during this period is crucial. In this section, we outline different 
forms support can take, directly to vulnerable households, in the form of food distributions, 
supporting firms and employment as well as delivering support through international supply chains.
1. Direct support for vulnerable households: Urgent action is needed to support households 
affected by the crisis. Where feasible, governments should prioritise:
  Increasing eligibility for social assistance: Given the urgency of providing assistance and 
the lack of information on vulnerability, governments should immediately broaden eligibility 
for existing programmes, eliminating conditionality altogether where possible, to minimise 
gaps in coverage.
  Identification of the newly vulnerable: Lockdowns will create a broad group of newly 
vulnerable households and increase potential for higher malnutrition and greater within-
household inequalities (with women and girls potentially at higher risk). Often, these newly 
vulnerable will not be covered by existing social protection programs, where they exist.
  Identification of existing channels for emergency support: Governments should assess who 
is currently covered by existing social protection programmes, banks and mobile money, 
and the overlap with newly vulnerable groups. Mobilising and coordinating with NGO and 
civil society sectors is also critical.
2. Food distribution: The limited scope of cash transfer programmes in low income countries 
and the current food supply chain issues and food price rises mean that establishing effective 
systems to distribute food safely are a priority. Where there are existing food support 
programmes, these can be built on. Centralised food procurement can also act as a form 
of income transfers to poor rural areas. It is important to note that collection from central 
distribution points could compromise physical distancing; decentralised distributions are 
therefore preferable. Food distribution can only be a short-term strategy and in the long run 
ensuring sustainable access to affordable food, through maintaining supply chains will be 
critical.
3. Supporting firms and employment: Providing direct support to firms is unlikely to be an 
effective way of delivering immediate support to vulnerable workers, where the majority of 
workers are operating in the informal sector. More work is needed on the scope for targeted 
assistance to medium and large firms, including through development finance institutions 
such as IFC and CDC. However, given the impossibility of providing broad wage support, as 
developed countries have done, more work is urgently needed on innovative ways to support 
informal sector employment.
4. Delivering support through international supply chains: Millions of workers and farmers are 
employed in the supply chains of global firms, such as apparel retailers and agricultural traders 
and processors commodities. These supply chains already have in place payment, monitoring 
and IT systems that can support the timely delivery of cash transfers. International firms should 
seek to maintain these supply chains to channel support to workers in the short term, where 
possible, and to maintain employment and purchasing relationships in the longer term, to reduce 
scarring effects.
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Policy response: Exiting lockdown and post-COVID-19 recovery
Work is needed now on how to support and manage the post-COVID-19 economic recovery. 
This will be an essential element of the exit strategy from containment, but is also important to 
minimise the long-term economic harm from the crisis and the containment and other measures 
imposed now. It will require a combination of both a health and economic strategy.
1. Health strategy: Governments should start to develop their post-lockdown strategy now. This will 
require an assessment of the feasibility of antibody testing, antigen testing, contact tracing (both 
internally and at borders) and mask requirements, as well as triggers for re-imposing lockdown. 
Since demand will exceed supply for diagnostic tests in the foreseeable future, there is a need for 
alternative data, such as sentinel surveillance and individual symptoms data, as well as a strategy 
for prioritising who should receive tests (e.g., health workers, police, essential government 
workers, those involved in maintaining essential supply chains). Furthermore, international support 
will be needed to secure access to and distribution of vaccines for developing countries, once 
one has been developed. Governments should start now to educate people about the vaccine, 
working to destigmatise and build trust. Community health workers can play a critical role in 
administering tests and vaccines.
2. Economic strategy: Further work is already needed to inform government decisions on the 
appropriate actions to support economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and on long-
term economic strategies, which will be different in a post-COVID-19 world. This will include 
addressing questions such as the role for import protection, food security as well as what can be 
done to stimulate large-scale job creation following the crisis.
Policy response: Maintaining trust in government
Maintaining trust in government is the foundation of an effective COVID-19 response: 
During periods of crisis, a lack of trust worsens outcomes – from bank runs, to food stockpiling to 
compromising physical distancing to get food. Governments must act in ways that reinforce trust in 
the functioning of basic systems, and maintain popular support for the COVID-19 policy response. 
Consistent policies and a clear delineation of responsibilities across government for crisis response 
are important, as are improving data and transparency and effective enforcement and delivery.
1. Improving data and transparency: Given the high level of uncertainty around the impact of the 
pandemic and the policy responses, increasing the supply and quality of data is essential both to 
inform policy choices and to maintain public support, especially if restrictions extend for a long 
period (see last section below).
2. Effective enforcement and delivery: Given the limits on state capacity, all public services and 
policy measures must be assessed in terms of the ability of governments to deliver and enforce 
them. Ensuring compliance is critical. 
3. Enlisting community support: Given the limits on state capacity, local support and initiative is 
critical. Local leaders must be well informed and integrated in the national effort. Community 
groups must see this struggle against the pandemic as their struggle. 
Data priorities to support the policy response
A continuous supply of up-to-date data will be important to foster learning and improve the 
policy response. It is important that government set up mechanisms to track how different levels 
of government are responding to the crisis. These should be simple and not place extra burden on 
staff, and should be designed to help the central government support lower tiers.
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1. Local health data: Local data on prevalence are needed to better understand the spread of 
COVID-19 and, in particular, to support localised containment strategies. In the absence of an 
adequate infrastructure for individual testing, other options should be pursued as a matter of 
urgency. Different data sources will complement each other and allow triangulation. For example:
  Household phone surveys can be useful to capture prevalence of symptoms. IVR can be 
used to generate sample frames where needed.
  Data collection by community health workers, for example, to record real-time data on 
symptoms or pneumonia cases (or to capture local food prices, see below)
  Surveys of district hospitals to collect data on pneumonia cases, as an indicator of 
COVID-19 infections.
  Sentinel surveillance measures (such as tests of waste water for presence of COVID-19 
virus) to help ascertain local prevalence.
  Targeted individual testing, where feasible, to calibrate symptoms and sentinel data.
  Smartphone location data to evaluate adherence to physical distancing, travel within cities, 
etc.
2. Data on economic activity: Granular data on the economic impact of the crisis is essential to 
inform government policies on the imposition, easing and design of containment measures and on 
the potential need for assistance to support livelihoods.
  Data on food prices: Local data on food prices are essential for identifying food shortages 
and for understanding the pressures on household incomes. Governments need higher 
frequency data on local food prices, since price variations can be substantial given that 
markets are often poorly integrated.
  Data on businesses and households: High frequency survey data on businesses and 
households including the informal sector can be used to inform the magnitude of the support 
needed as well as where support is most needed.
  Data on customs payments and VAT: High frequency customs data and the firm-to-firm 
transactions data from electronic billing machines can provide near real-time indicators of 
international trade and internal economic activity.
  Data on logistics, supply chains and border crossings: Real-time data on truck delays, 
ports and container availability could help identify bottlenecks. Administrative or GPS data 
on sub-national transport, particularly food could help identify shortages and supply chain 
issues.
  Mobile phone data: Call detail record (CDR) and mobile money transactions data can 
provide rich, high frequency information on the economic impact of the crisis.
Note: For correspondence regarding this guidance note, please contact Professor Jonathan Leape, Executive 
Director, International Growth Centre (j.leape@lse.ac.uk and copy-in COVID-19@theigc.org).
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